containerization/PATCHES.md

# Vendored `containerization` — Nucleic patches

> Overview of *why* these patches exist (the session-isolation model) + the build/validate workflow:
> [`docs/CONTAINER_ISOLATION.md`](../../docs/CONTAINER_ISOLATION.md). This file is the per-patch detail.

This is a **vendored copy** of [apple/containerization](https://github.com/apple/containerization)
at upstream commit `6b7b42ca3efeee8c706070e4355e6a807c5336ae`, referenced by the root `Package.swift`
via `.package(path: "third_party/containerization")` instead of the github URL.

It is vendored (not pulled) because we carry a local patch upstream doesn't have. Keeping it
in-tree means the patch can't be lost to a dependency re-resolve.

## What's changed vs. upstream

1. **`Sources/Containerization/LinuxContainer.swift` — forward VM extensions.**
   `LinuxContainer.Configuration` gains a `vmExtensions: [any Sendable]` field, and
   `LinuxContainer` assigns it into `VMConfiguration.extensions` when it builds the VM config.
   Upstream already supports `VMConfiguration.extensions` + the `VZInstanceExtension` hook
   (`configureVZ`/`didCreate`), but `LinuxContainer` — the only entry point we use — never forwarded
   it, so there was no way to attach a device (e.g. a virtio memory balloon) to a container's VM.
   Search for the marker comment `[Nucleic vendored patch]` to find both edit sites.

   Nucleic uses this to attach a `VZVirtioTraditionalMemoryBalloonDeviceConfiguration` and drive its
   target at runtime for automatic VM memory reclamation — see `MemoryBalloon.swift` /
   `ContainerEngine` in NucleicCore.

2. **`Sources/Containerization/LinuxProcess.swift` — process-group kill.**
   `LinuxProcess` gains `killProcessGroup(_:)`, which signals the negative pid (`-pid`) so the
   guest's `kill(2)` targets the exec'd process's whole **process group**, not just the leader.
   Every exec is `setsid()`'d by `vmexec`, so the process is its own group leader (pgid == pid) and
   a group signal reaches the children it forked. Upstream only exposes the leader-only `kill(_:)`,
   which let a forked child survive a Stop in a long-lived shared container. Marked with
   `[Nucleic vendored patch]`; used by `ContainerizedProcessHandle.sendSignal` in NucleicCore.

3. **`Sources/Containerization/LinuxProcess.swift` — stdio-connection diagnostics (log-only).**
   `setupIO` logs (`os.Logger`, subsystem `com.nucleic`, category `container-io`) when a *configured*
   stdio stream's guest side never connects — which leaves its host `FileHandle` nil, so the relay /
   readability handler is never wired and the agent's stdin is never delivered (it hangs) or its
   stdout is never read (the "no output, just a spinner" symptom in Nucleic Control containers).
   Behavior is unchanged; it only surfaces the failing stream. Marked `[Nucleic vendored patch]`
   (the `import os`, the `nucleicIOLog` static, and the per-stream check in `setupIO`). All three are
   wrapped in `#if canImport(os)` — non-Xcode toolchains (e.g. a swiftly Swift used to cross-build the
   host framework) resolve Foundation/Virtualization but not the `os` overlay, so the diagnostic
   degrades to a no-op there instead of failing the build; Xcode (the local `make vminit-image` path)
   builds keep it.

4. **Trimmed for footprint (no behavior change).** `Tests/`, `docs/`, `examples/`, and `images/`
   were dropped, and the corresponding `.testTarget(...)` entries removed from `Package.swift`. The
   library/executable targets we build are untouched.

5. **`Sources/Containerization/LinuxProcess.swift` — non-blocking stdio relay.**
   Upstream's `setupIO` relays guest stdout/stderr with `FileHandle.availableData`, a **blocking**
   read, from inside a `readabilityHandler`. Those handlers run on Foundation's shared readability
   queue, so if one exec's guest stdout wedged mid-stream that blocking read parked the shared thread
   and head-of-line-blocked **every** other exec's stdout/stderr relay across all containers — one
   stuck session froze the others. The patch marks each connected fd `O_NONBLOCK` and drains it via a
   new `nucleicDrainNonBlocking` (returns bytes + EOF, never blocks; EAGAIN just waits for the next
   readable event). A wedged stream is now contained to its own exec. Marked `[Nucleic vendored patch]`
   (the two static helpers `nucleicSetNonBlocking`/`nucleicDrainNonBlocking` and the two rewritten
   `readabilityHandler` blocks). Requires host-side POSIX `read`/`fcntl`/`errno`.

6. **`Sources/Containerization/LinuxProcess.swift` — atomic stdio-or-abort start.**
   In `start()`, after `setupIO` returns, if a *configured* stdio stream never connected from the
   guest (its `FileHandle` is nil — patch #3's logged failure), the patch tears the just-created exec
   back down (`agent.deleteProcess`) and throws instead of calling `startProcess`. Upstream proceeds
   and runs a process with a dead stream (stdin never delivered → hangs; stdout never read → the "no
   output, just a spinner" 60s stall in Nucleic Control). Now that permanent silent stall surfaces as
   a clean, retryable start error. Marked `[Nucleic vendored patch]` (the guard block before
   `startProcess`).

7. **`Sources/Containerization/Vminitd.swift` — bounded teardown RPC.**
   `deleteProcess` now sends a 30s `CallOptions.timeout` (upstream sends none, so it can block
   forever on a wedged agent channel). Nucleic calls `LinuxProcess.delete()` after every turn to
   reclaim the per-exec vsock/gRPC connection `exec()` dials; an unbounded `deleteProcess` would let
   that reclaim hang and the connection leak. On the thrown deadline, `performDeletion` still closes
   the agent connection. Marked `[Nucleic vendored patch]` (the `callOpts` block in `deleteProcess`).
   NOTE: this pairs with a Nucleic-side change in `ContainerizedProcessHandle` (call `delete()` after
   the exec exits / on force-close) — without that caller, upstream never deletes execs at all and
   the shared control container leaks a connection + `runConnections()` task per turn.

10. **`Sources/ContainerizationOS/Socket/Socket.swift` — `acceptStream` survives transient accept
   errors.** Upstream cancelled the accept `DispatchSource` on ANY `accept(2)` failure, permanently
   ending accepting while the socket stayed **bound and listening** — a silent black hole: every
   later client `connect(2)` SUCCEEDED into the kernel backlog and hung forever unanswered. When
   the socket is the relayed control plane of a shared container, that is the "agent produced no
   output within 60s / stdio transport stalled" all-sessions wedge, fixable only by recreating the
   VM (an app restart). Transient errors — `ECONNABORTED`/`ECONNRESET` (a queued connection dying
   before accept, routine under connection churn), `EMFILE`/`ENFILE`/`ENOBUFS`/`ENOMEM` (resource
   pressure), `EINTR`/`EAGAIN` — now skip that one accept and keep listening (new
   `isTransientAcceptError`). This is SHARED code: the fix reaches the host by a normal build and
   the guest via the initfs rebuild. Marked `[Nucleic vendored patch]`.

11. **`Sources/Containerization/UnixSocketRelay.swift` — relay loops contain per-connection
   failures.** Both accept loops (`setupHostVsockListener` — the host half of a container's relayed
   control socket — and `setupHostVsockDial`) used to let ONE thrown per-connection dial/connect
   (host server rebinding, backlog momentarily full → `ECONNREFUSED`, fd pressure) propagate out of
   the loop, whose teardown then removed the vsock listener — permanently severing every session in
   the container from the host control plane. Each connection is now handled on its own task with
   its error logged and contained (mirroring the guest `VsockProxy`), and the pre-relay failure
   paths close both ends so a failed connection fails FAST for the peer and leaks no fds. Marked
   `[Nucleic vendored patch]`.

13. **`Sources/ContainerizationOS/Keychain/KeychainQuery.swift` — prompt-free registry-credential
   reads.** Upstream's `get`/`list`/`exists` call `SecItemCopyMatching` with the legacy login
   Keychain's interactive authorization panel enabled, so any process that isn't on a registry
   internet-password item's ACL raises the macOS *"'cctl' wants to use your confidential information
   stored in 'ghcr.io' in your keychain"* panel when it reads that item — e.g. a `cctl` binary
   re-signed ad-hoc by a fresh `make vminit-image` reading a GHCR token an earlier build stored, or
   any tool linking `KeychainHelper.lookup` during an image pull/push/list. Nucleic's rule is that no
   automatic credential lookup may ever raise a Keychain panel. This patch wraps the three
   `SecItemCopyMatching` reads in `withoutInteractiveUI` (`SecKeychainSetUserInteractionAllowed(false)`
   — the only switch that governs the legacy ACL/partition-list dialog; the data-protection
   `kSecUseAuthenticationUI*` flags do NOT), so an already-trusted item reads silently while anything
   else fails with `errSecInteractionNotAllowed` — which `isQuerySuccessful` now treats as "not found"
   so the caller falls back to anonymous / `REGISTRY_HOST`/`USERNAME`/`TOKEN` env auth. `save`
   (the `cctl login` write path) gains a delete-and-retry on `errSecDuplicateItem`, since the
   now-silent `exists` can under-report an unreadable pre-existing item. Mirrors
   `KeychainOwnedAccess.withoutLegacyKeychainUI` in NucleicCore. Host-side (shipped by a normal
   `swift build`). The three `SecKeychain*` symbols are formally deprecated but are the only API
   covering the legacy ACL panel; they're bound directly via `@_silgen_name` (`nucleic_SecKeychain*`,
   top of file) so the required calls compile without deprecation warnings. Marked
   `[Nucleic vendored patch]`.

14. **`Sources/Containerization/Vminitd.swift` — configure the gRPC pipeline before the channel goes
   active.** `Vminitd.init` used the now-deprecated `HTTP2ClientTransport.WrappedChannel.wrapping(
   channel:config:serviceConfig:)`, which wraps an already-connected channel best-effort and may drop
   early server frames such as SETTINGS. Migrated to `wrapping(config:serviceConfig:makeChannel:)`,
   which invokes the transport's `configure` inside the bootstrap's channel initializer — before the
   vsock channel becomes active. `init` is now `async throws` (the new overload is async); its callers
   in `VZVirtualMachineInstance` (`start`/`dialAgent`, both already async) and the integration test now
   `try await`. Marked `[Nucleic vendored patch]`.

### GUEST-side patches (require rebuilding the initfs — see below)

Patches #1–#7 are host-side (the `Containerization` library), shipped by a normal `swift build`.
Patches #8+ live in `vminitd/` (the guest agent), which rides in the initfs OCI image. They are INERT
until that image is rebuilt from this source and published, and `ContainerEngine.vminitReference`
points at it. Build it with **`make vminit-image`** (root Makefile) — it builds cctl + the guest
vminitd/vmexec from this vendored tree and packages `ghcr.io/abkslm/vminit:<tag>` into the local cctl
store; `make vminit-image-push` publishes it (authenticate once with `make vminit-image-login`, which
stores a GHCR token in the macOS Keychain — or set `REGISTRY_HOST`/`USERNAME`/`TOKEN`), and
`vminitReference` is pinned to that custom image. First time on a machine, run `make vminit-image-prep` once (installs
the swiftly toolchain + musl SDK the guest cross-build needs). Bump the `-nucleicN` tag suffix and
rebuild whenever a guest patch changes. Built locally, not in CI: the host framework needs the macOS
26+ Virtualization SDK that GitHub-hosted runners lack.

8. **`vminitd/Sources/VminitdCore/ManagedProcess.swift` — offload the blocking start off the event loop.**
   `ManagedProcess.start()` did synchronous, potentially slow pipe reads (waiting for `vmexec` to
   return the pid, then for the error pipe to close) while holding `state`'s Mutex, ON the calling
   task — which is the gRPC handler's event-loop thread. A slow start therefore parked the loop and
   head-of-line-blocked sibling execs' control RPCs sharing it. The patch splits the body into a
   synchronous `startBlocking()` and an async `start()` that runs it on `DispatchQueue.global` via a
   checked continuation, keeping the loop responsive. Safe because the body has no `await` and
   `ManagedProcess` is `Sendable`. Marked `[Nucleic vendored patch]`.

9. **Per-exec cgroups (OOM/CPU/pids isolation).** Upstream puts the container init AND every exec in
   ONE cgroup (`/container/<id>`), so one session's runaway RSS trips the in-VM OOM-killer against a
   *random* sibling, and a fork bomb / CPU hog hits the whole box. This patch makes `/container/<id>`
   an intermediary: the resource ceiling stays on it, `ManagedContainer.init` moves the init into its
   own leaf (`/container/<id>/init`) which enables `cgroup.subtree_control` up the chain, and
   `ManagedProcess.start` places each exec in its OWN child (`/container/<id>/<execID>`) with
   `memory.oom.group=1` (a runaway session's OOM kills only *its* tree), a fair `cpu.weight`, and a
   `pids.max` fork-bomb backstop. New `Cgroup2Manager` helpers: `setOomGroup`/`setCpuWeight`/
   `setPidsMax`/`remove`. **Best-effort with a graceful fallback**: if any step of the per-exec setup
   fails it wipes the partial state and reverts to the flat layout, and `ManagedProcess` falls back to
   the container cgroup per exec — so a cgroup hiccup degrades to today's behavior, never a failed
   start. `ManagedContainer.execCgroupParent == nil` marks flat mode.

   Beyond scoped-OOM, a **hard host-configured per-exec `memory.max`** is also wired — WITHOUT a
   protobuf change, because the exec already ships the full OCI `Spec` and the guest just ignored
   `linux.resources`. Host: `LinuxProcessConfiguration.memoryLimitInBytes` → `LinuxContainer.exec`
   stamps it onto `spec.linux.resources.memory.limit`. Guest: `Server+GRPC.createProcess` reads that
   back and passes it to `createExec`/`ManagedProcess`, which sets `memory.max` (new
   `Cgroup2Manager.setMemoryMax`) on the exec's cgroup — so a session can't consume the whole box
   before its own OOM. Driven by Nucleic's `ContainerServiceSettings.controlPerSessionMemoryGiB`
   (default 0 = off; applied only to the shared control container, via `ContainerManager.exec`), so the
   default stays scoped-OOM-only. Marked `[Nucleic vendored patch]` across `Cgroup2Manager.swift`,
   `ManagedContainer.swift`, `ManagedProcess.swift`, `Server+GRPC.swift` (guest) and
   `LinuxProcessConfiguration.swift`, `LinuxContainer.swift` (host). **COMPILE-VERIFIED (host + musl
   cross-build); NOT yet runtime-validated** — a
   wrong cgroup-v2 hierarchy fails at runtime, so boot a container with the new image and confirm
   sessions start, `/sys/fs/cgroup/container/<id>/<execID>` exists per session, and a hog is contained,
   before pointing a shipping build at it. `vmexec/RunCommand` is unchanged: it still applies
   `linux.resources` at `linux.cgroupsPath`, which the patch repoints (init leaf) and clears
   accordingly.

12. **`vminitd/Sources/VminitdCore/VsockProxy.swift` — leak-proof, crash-proof relay connections;
   no black-hole listener.** Four fixes to the guest half of the relayed control socket (the path
   every session's MCP/approval traffic crosses in a shared container):
   - **fd leak (the root of the recurring all-sessions stall):** `cleanup` ran its two epoll
     unregisters and two `close(2)`s in one `do/catch`, so a thrown unregister SKIPPED the closes —
     leaking both connection fds. Control-plane traffic is connection-churny by design (an SSE
     `tools/call` closes its connection every gated call; every intercepted git/gh/command event is
     a short-lived connection), so the leaks accumulated until vminitd hit `EMFILE`, its accept
     path began failing, and — before patch #10 — the accept stream died with the guest socket
     still bound: every session in the container then stalled ("produced no output within 60s")
     until the VM was recreated. Each cleanup step now runs independently.
   - **double-resume crash:** both fds' epoll handlers can reach the cleanup condition; a second
     entry would resume the `CheckedContinuation` twice — a fatal trap in the VM's PID-1 agent.
     `cleanup` is now once-guarded.
   - **`try!` registrations:** an `epoll_ctl` failure crashed vminitd outright; registration
     failures now fail only that connection, releasing whatever was already set up.
   - **no black-hole listener:** if the accept loop ever ends unexpectedly, the proxy now closes
     its listener (new `listenerLoopEnded`), so peers get fail-fast refusals instead of connecting
     into a never-accepted backlog. A failed pre-relay connection is also closed explicitly.
   Marked `[Nucleic vendored patch]`.

## Re-vendoring a newer upstream commit

1. `git clone` upstream (or copy `.build/checkouts/containerization` after bumping the URL pin
   temporarily), check out the desired commit.
2. `rsync -a --exclude=.git --exclude=.build --exclude=.swiftpm --exclude=Tests/ --exclude=docs/ \
   --exclude=images/ <upstream>/ third_party/containerization/`
3. Remove the `.testTarget(...)` blocks from `third_party/containerization/Package.swift`.
4. Re-apply patch #1 (the `vmExtensions` field + the `vmConfig.extensions = …` forward), patch #2
   (`LinuxProcess.killProcessGroup(_:)`), patch #3 (the `setupIO` stdio-connection log + its
   `import os` / `nucleicIOLog`), patch #5 (the non-blocking stdio relay: `nucleicSetNonBlocking` /
   `nucleicDrainNonBlocking` + the rewritten `readabilityHandler` blocks), and patch #6 (the atomic
   stdio-or-abort guard in `start()`), patch #7 (the bounded `deleteProcess` timeout in
   `Vminitd.swift`), and patch #8 (the `ManagedProcess.start` event-loop offload in `vminitd/`). Grep
   for `[Nucleic vendored patch]` to find every site, and patch #9 (per-exec cgroups) across
   `Cgroup2Manager.swift` / `ManagedContainer.swift` / `ManagedProcess.swift`, patch #10
   (`Socket.acceptStream` transient-error tolerance + `isTransientAcceptError`), patch #11 (the
   `UnixSocketRelay` per-connection containment + fail-fast closes), patch #12 (the `VsockProxy`
   cleanup/`try!`/listener hardening in `vminitd/`), and patch #13 (the prompt-free
   `KeychainQuery` reads: `withoutInteractiveUI` + the `errSecInteractionNotAllowed` handling +
   the `save` duplicate retry). After re-applying any
   `vminitd/` patch, rebuild + publish the custom init image
   with `make vminit-image` + `make vminit-image-push`, and bump `ContainerEngine.vminitReference`.
5. Update the commit hash above and in the root `Package.swift` comment.
6. `swift build` and run the balloon tests.