Per-exec cgroups follow-up: host-configured hard memory.max (no protobuf)

Adds an opt-in hard per-session memory ceiling on top of patch #9's scoped-OOM.
The exec already ships the full OCI Spec, so the limit rides
spec.linux.resources.memory.limit — no RPC/protobuf change:

- host framework: LinuxProcessConfiguration.memoryLimitInBytes; LinuxContainer.exec
  stamps it onto the exec spec.
- guest: Server+GRPC.createProcess reads it back and applies it as the exec
  cgroup's memory.max (new Cgroup2Manager.setMemoryMax) via createExec/ManagedProcess.
- Nucleic: ContainerServiceSettings.controlPerSessionMemoryGiB (default 0 = off),
  applied only to the shared control container (ContainerManager.exec); wired
  through ContainerEngine.exec.

So one session can't consume the whole shared container's memory before its own
(oom.group-scoped) OOM. Default off preserves #9's behavior. Compile-verified host
+ musl guest; rides the pending -nucleic2 image, still runtime-pending.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
2026-07-13 20:12:42 -07:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 4.8
parent 2eb563c90c
commit 831d19c3a6
7 changed files with 53 additions and 8 deletions
@@ -895,10 +895,18 @@ extension Initd: Com_Apple_Containerization_Sandbox_V3_SandboxContext.SimpleServ
// This is an exec.
if let container = await self.state.containers[request.containerID] {
// [Nucleic vendored patch] A per-exec memory ceiling rides the exec's OCI
// resources (set host-side by LinuxContainer.exec); apply it as this exec's
// own memory.max (patch #9). Only positive limits count.
let execMemoryLimit: UInt64? = {
guard let limit = ociSpec.linux?.resources?.memory?.limit, limit > 0 else { return nil }
return UInt64(limit)
}()
try await container.createExec(
id: request.id,
stdio: stdioPorts,
process: process
process: process,
memoryLimitBytes: execMemoryLimit
)
} else {
// We need to make our new fangled container.