Per-exec cgroups follow-up: host-configured hard memory.max (no protobuf)
Adds an opt-in hard per-session memory ceiling on top of patch #9's scoped-OOM. The exec already ships the full OCI Spec, so the limit rides spec.linux.resources.memory.limit — no RPC/protobuf change: - host framework: LinuxProcessConfiguration.memoryLimitInBytes; LinuxContainer.exec stamps it onto the exec spec. - guest: Server+GRPC.createProcess reads it back and applies it as the exec cgroup's memory.max (new Cgroup2Manager.setMemoryMax) via createExec/ManagedProcess. - Nucleic: ContainerServiceSettings.controlPerSessionMemoryGiB (default 0 = off), applied only to the shared control container (ContainerManager.exec); wired through ContainerEngine.exec. So one session can't consume the whole shared container's memory before its own (oom.group-scoped) OOM. Default off preserves #9's behavior. Compile-verified host + musl guest; rides the pending -nucleic2 image, still runtime-pending. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
+14
-6
@@ -109,12 +109,20 @@ rebuild whenever a guest patch changes. Built locally, not in CI: the host frame
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`setPidsMax`/`remove`. **Best-effort with a graceful fallback**: if any step of the per-exec setup
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fails it wipes the partial state and reverts to the flat layout, and `ManagedProcess` falls back to
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the container cgroup per exec — so a cgroup hiccup degrades to today's behavior, never a failed
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start. `ManagedContainer.execCgroupParent == nil` marks flat mode. NOTE: this delivers *scoped-OOM*
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containment without host-configured limits; a hard per-exec `memory.max` (host-chosen, so a session
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can't consume the whole box before its own OOM) still wants the exec-RPC resources field
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(protobuf + `Vminitd.createProcess`/`ContainerEngine.exec` plumbing) — a follow-up. Marked
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`[Nucleic vendored patch]` across `Cgroup2Manager.swift`, `ManagedContainer.swift`,
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`ManagedProcess.swift`. **COMPILE-VERIFIED ONLY (musl cross-build); NOT yet runtime-validated** — a
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start. `ManagedContainer.execCgroupParent == nil` marks flat mode.
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Beyond scoped-OOM, a **hard host-configured per-exec `memory.max`** is also wired — WITHOUT a
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protobuf change, because the exec already ships the full OCI `Spec` and the guest just ignored
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`linux.resources`. Host: `LinuxProcessConfiguration.memoryLimitInBytes` → `LinuxContainer.exec`
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stamps it onto `spec.linux.resources.memory.limit`. Guest: `Server+GRPC.createProcess` reads that
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back and passes it to `createExec`/`ManagedProcess`, which sets `memory.max` (new
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`Cgroup2Manager.setMemoryMax`) on the exec's cgroup — so a session can't consume the whole box
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before its own OOM. Driven by Nucleic's `ContainerServiceSettings.controlPerSessionMemoryGiB`
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(default 0 = off; applied only to the shared control container, via `ContainerManager.exec`), so the
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default stays scoped-OOM-only. Marked `[Nucleic vendored patch]` across `Cgroup2Manager.swift`,
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`ManagedContainer.swift`, `ManagedProcess.swift`, `Server+GRPC.swift` (guest) and
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`LinuxProcessConfiguration.swift`, `LinuxContainer.swift` (host). **COMPILE-VERIFIED (host + musl
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cross-build); NOT yet runtime-validated** — a
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wrong cgroup-v2 hierarchy fails at runtime, so boot a container with the new image and confirm
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sessions start, `/sys/fs/cgroup/container/<id>/<execID>` exists per session, and a hog is contained,
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before pointing a shipping build at it. `vmexec/RunCommand` is unchanged: it still applies
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@@ -911,6 +911,11 @@ extension LinuxContainer {
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var config = LinuxProcessConfiguration()
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try configuration(&config)
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spec.process = config.toOCI()
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// [Nucleic vendored patch] Per-exec memory ceiling → the exec's OCI resources, which the
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// guest applies as memory.max on this exec's own cgroup (patch #9).
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if let limit = config.memoryLimitInBytes {
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spec.linux?.resources?.memory?.limit = Int64(limit)
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}
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let stdio = IOUtil.setup(
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portAllocator: self.hostVsockPorts,
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@@ -948,6 +953,10 @@ extension LinuxContainer {
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var spec = self.generateRuntimeSpec()
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spec.process = configuration.toOCI()
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// [Nucleic vendored patch] Per-exec memory ceiling → the exec's OCI resources (see above).
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if let limit = configuration.memoryLimitInBytes {
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spec.linux?.resources?.memory?.limit = Int64(limit)
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}
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let stdio = IOUtil.setup(
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portAllocator: self.hostVsockPorts,
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@@ -388,6 +388,11 @@ public struct LinuxProcessConfiguration: Sendable {
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public var stdout: Writer?
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/// The stderr for the process.
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public var stderr: Writer?
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/// [Nucleic vendored patch] A hard per-exec memory ceiling in bytes. When set, `LinuxContainer.exec`
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/// stamps it onto the exec's `spec.linux.resources.memory.limit`, which the guest applies as
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/// `memory.max` on this exec's own cgroup (see patch #9) — so one session can't consume the whole
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/// shared container's memory before *its own* OOM. nil → no per-exec ceiling (inherit the container).
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public var memoryLimitInBytes: UInt64?
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public init() {}
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@@ -288,6 +288,12 @@ public struct Cgroup2Manager: Sendable {
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try Self.writeValue(path: self.path, value: String(max), fileName: "pids.max")
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}
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/// [Nucleic vendored patch] Hard memory ceiling (`memory.max`) — a host-configured per-exec cap so
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/// one session can't consume the whole container's memory before its own (oom.group-scoped) OOM.
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package func setMemoryMax(bytes: UInt64) throws {
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try Self.writeValue(path: self.path, value: String(bytes), fileName: "memory.max")
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}
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/// [Nucleic vendored patch] Remove this cgroup directory (rmdir). The cgroup must already be empty
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/// of processes and child cgroups. Best-effort partial-setup cleanup for the per-exec layout.
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package func remove() throws {
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@@ -201,7 +201,8 @@ extension ManagedContainer {
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func createExec(
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id: String,
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stdio: HostStdio,
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process: ContainerizationOCI.Process
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process: ContainerizationOCI.Process,
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memoryLimitBytes: UInt64? = nil // [Nucleic vendored patch] hard per-exec memory.max
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) throws {
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log.debug("creating exec process with \(process)")
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@@ -217,6 +218,7 @@ extension ManagedContainer {
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bundle: self.bundle,
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owningPid: self.initProcess.pid,
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execCgroupParent: self.execCgroupParent, // [Nucleic vendored patch] per-exec cgroup
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execMemoryLimitBytes: memoryLimitBytes, // [Nucleic vendored patch]
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log: self.log
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)
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self.execs[id] = process
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@@ -60,6 +60,8 @@ final class ManagedProcess: ContainerProcess, Sendable {
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// [Nucleic vendored patch] Parent cgroup for this exec's OWN per-exec child (`<parent>/<id>`);
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// nil means the legacy flat layout (join the container/init cgroup via `owningPid`).
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private let execCgroupParent: String?
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// [Nucleic vendored patch] Hard per-exec memory.max (bytes) for this exec's cgroup; nil = none.
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private let execMemoryLimitBytes: UInt64?
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private let ackPipe: Pipe
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private let syncPipe: Pipe
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private let errorPipe: Pipe
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@@ -78,6 +80,7 @@ final class ManagedProcess: ContainerProcess, Sendable {
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bundle: ContainerizationOCI.Bundle,
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owningPid: Int32? = nil,
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execCgroupParent: String? = nil, // [Nucleic vendored patch]
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execMemoryLimitBytes: UInt64? = nil, // [Nucleic vendored patch]
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log: Logger
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) throws {
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self.id = id
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@@ -86,6 +89,7 @@ final class ManagedProcess: ContainerProcess, Sendable {
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self.log = log
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self.owningPid = owningPid
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self.execCgroupParent = execCgroupParent
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self.execMemoryLimitBytes = execMemoryLimitBytes
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let syncPipe = Pipe()
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try syncPipe.setCloexec()
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@@ -233,6 +237,9 @@ extension ManagedProcess {
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try? execCg.setOomGroup(true)
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try? execCg.setCpuWeight(100)
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try? execCg.setPidsMax(4096)
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if let limit = execMemoryLimitBytes, limit > 0 {
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try? execCg.setMemoryMax(bytes: limit) // host-configured hard per-exec ceiling
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}
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try execCg.addProcess(pid: pid)
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} catch {
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log.error("per-exec cgroup for \(id) failed; joining the container cgroup: \(error)")
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@@ -895,10 +895,18 @@ extension Initd: Com_Apple_Containerization_Sandbox_V3_SandboxContext.SimpleServ
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// This is an exec.
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if let container = await self.state.containers[request.containerID] {
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// [Nucleic vendored patch] A per-exec memory ceiling rides the exec's OCI
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// resources (set host-side by LinuxContainer.exec); apply it as this exec's
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// own memory.max (patch #9). Only positive limits count.
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let execMemoryLimit: UInt64? = {
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guard let limit = ociSpec.linux?.resources?.memory?.limit, limit > 0 else { return nil }
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return UInt64(limit)
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}()
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try await container.createExec(
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id: request.id,
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stdio: stdioPorts,
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process: process
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process: process,
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memoryLimitBytes: execMemoryLimit
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)
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} else {
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// We need to make our new fangled container.
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