Read App Intents Documentation

Nucleic-Session: 56C5F781-4444-466B-91CE-A7734A8E117F
Co-authored-by: Nucleic <[email protected]>

NucleicRemote/NucleicRemote/AppIntents/ApprovalIntents.swift

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+import AppIntents
+import NucleicProtocol
+
+// MARK: - Decision option (§6 enums)
+
+/// The decision an approval intent can carry, mapped from the wire `Decision` (`Approval.swift`).
+/// The `allowAlways` cases are the safe subset (session / this-tool); pattern scopes and any allow
+/// on a destructive request are handled by the risk gate, not offered here.
+enum ApprovalDecisionOption: String, AppEnum {
+    case allow
+    case deny
+    case allowAlwaysSession
+    case allowAlwaysTool
+
+    static let typeDisplayRepresentation = TypeDisplayRepresentation(name: "Decision")
+    static let caseDisplayRepresentations: [ApprovalDecisionOption: DisplayRepresentation] = [
+        .allow: "Allow",
+        .deny: "Deny",
+        .allowAlwaysSession: "Always Allow (this session)",
+        .allowAlwaysTool: "Always Allow (this tool)",
+    ]
+
+    /// Whether this decision grants the request (everything but `deny`) — the half the risk gate
+    /// forbids inline on a high-risk approval.
+    var isAllow: Bool { self != .deny }
+
+    /// The wire `Decision` this option resolves to.
+    func decision() -> Decision {
+        switch self {
+        case .allow: .allow(updatedInput: nil)
+        case .deny: .deny(reason: nil)
+        case .allowAlwaysSession: .allowAlways(.session)
+        case .allowAlwaysTool: .allowAlways(.toolName)
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+// MARK: - Approval entity (§4.6)
+
+/// A pending approval exposed to Shortcuts/Siri. Backed by `RemoteStore.openApprovals`, which the
+/// phone holds in full (id, risk, title) only for the *subscribed* session — so today this surfaces
+/// the approvals of the session you're looking at. (A global pending-approvals feed would need the
+/// host to carry the top approval's id/risk on the wire summary; see §4.1 / the Live Activity note.)
+struct ApprovalEntity: AppEntity, Identifiable {
+    static let typeDisplayRepresentation = TypeDisplayRepresentation(name: "Approval")
+    static let defaultQuery = ApprovalEntityQuery()
+
+    /// `ApprovalID.rawValue`.
+    var id: String
+    /// `SessionID.rawValue` of the owning session — routes the decision to the right Mac.
+    var sessionID: String
+    var toolName: String
+    var requestTitle: String
+    /// `Risk.rawValue`, kept for display; the gate uses `isHighRisk`.
+    var riskLabel: String
+    /// Destructive / network / host-exec — never allowed inline (§3.3).
+    var isHighRisk: Bool
+
+    var displayRepresentation: DisplayRepresentation {
+        DisplayRepresentation(
+            title: "\(toolName): \(requestTitle)",
+            subtitle: "\(riskLabel)")
+    }
+}
+
+extension ApprovalEntity {
+    init(_ r: ApprovalRequest) {
+        self.init(
+            id: r.id.rawValue,
+            sessionID: r.sessionID.rawValue,
+            toolName: r.toolName,
+            requestTitle: r.title,
+            riskLabel: r.risk.label,
+            isHighRisk: r.risk.isHigh)
+    }
+}
+
+struct ApprovalEntityQuery: EntityQuery {
+    @MainActor
+    func entities(for identifiers: [ApprovalEntity.ID]) async throws -> [ApprovalEntity] {
+        let wanted = Set(identifiers)
+        return RemoteStore.shared.openApprovals
+            .filter { wanted.contains($0.id.rawValue) }
+            .map(ApprovalEntity.init)
+    }
+
+    @MainActor
+    func suggestedEntities() async throws -> [ApprovalEntity] {
+        RemoteStore.shared.openApprovals.map(ApprovalEntity.init)
+    }
+}
+
+// MARK: - Answer an approval (§4.1, the flagship)
+
+/// Allow or deny what an agent is asking to do. The risk gate (§3.3) is enforced here so an intent
+/// can never be a softer approval path than the UI: a high-risk request (destructive / network /
+/// host-exec) is never granted inline — it routes to the app's guarded card. Deny always goes
+/// straight through. "Already resolved elsewhere" is a friendly no-op (§3.4), not an error, because
+/// the host de-dupes a lost first-responder race.
+struct AnswerApprovalIntent: AppIntent {
+    static let title: LocalizedStringResource = "Answer Approval"
+    static let description = IntentDescription(
+        "Allow or deny what a Nucleic agent is asking to do.")
+
+    @Parameter(title: "Approval")
+    var approval: ApprovalEntity
+
+    @Parameter(title: "Decision", default: .allow)
+    var decision: ApprovalDecisionOption
+
+    init() {}
+    init(approval: ApprovalEntity, decision: ApprovalDecisionOption) {
+        self.approval = approval
+        self.decision = decision
+    }
+
+    @MainActor
+    func perform() async throws -> some IntentResult & ProvidesDialog {
+        let store = RemoteStore.shared
+        guard store.isPaired else { throw IntentError.notPaired }
+        let approvalID = ApprovalID(rawValue: approval.id)
+        let sessionID = SessionID(rawValue: approval.sessionID)
+
+        // §3.3 — high-risk can't be granted inline; route to the app's biometric-gated card.
+        if approval.isHighRisk, decision.isAllow {
+            store.route(to: sessionID)
+            throw IntentError.needsAppConfirmation
+        }
+
+        guard await store.awaitLiveConnection() else { throw IntentError.macUnreachable }
+        store.respondToApproval(id: approvalID, sessionID: sessionID, decision: decision.decision())
+        return .result(dialog: decision.isAllow ? "Allowed." : "Denied.")
+    }
+
+    static var parameterSummary: some ParameterSummary {
+        Summary("\(\.$decision) \(\.$approval)")
+    }
+}